Security
Security
Reporting
Report vulnerabilities through GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting on the
repository (the Security tab → Report a vulnerability). Please do not open a
public issue for a suspected vulnerability. This is a best-effort project — there is
no security@ mailbox, PGP key, response SLA, or CVE pipeline; GitHub's advisory
workflow is the single supported channel. The full policy is in the repository's
SECURITY.md.
What this library defends
The security-sensitive design decisions, and where each is documented:
Authoritative reads over cached reads
Domain verification and
propagation read from a zone's authoritative
nameservers, not a recursive cache. A recursive cache can be stale or, on a shared
resolver, poisoned — so trusting it for an ownership decision is unsafe. Verification
is deny-by-default: any failure or non-exact match is false, and the token
compare is constant-time (hash_equals).
Response-spoofing resistance
The socket resolver accepts a UDP answer only when its transaction ID and echoed question (name + type) match the query; a mismatch is rejected as malformed rather than trusted. Optional 0x20 mixed-case encoding adds further entropy where the server preserves case. This is what makes a direct authoritative read trustworthy against off-path spoofing.
SSRF-safe nameserver discovery
A domain owner controls their own NS and glue records, so the authoritative
resolver treats NS-derived addresses as untrusted: by default it queries only
globally-routable public IPs (RFC1918, loopback, link-local/metadata, and other
reserved space are refused) and caps the NS fan-out. allowNonPublicNameservers
opts into LAN/internal servers when you deliberately want to check one. Nameserver
IPs you pass explicitly are never filtered — only ones discovered from DNS.
DNSSEC validation, deny-by-default
The DNSSEC module validates the chain itself rather than
trusting a resolver's AD bit. Anything not provably Secure or provably
Insecure is Bogus: unknown algorithm, tampered or expired signature, broken DS
link, out-of-bailiwick signer, unproven wildcard — all rejected. See the full
threat model and the deny-by-default matrix.
Key posture points:
- Signature math is delegated to OpenSSL (RSA/ECDSA) and libsodium (Ed25519) — never hand-rolled.
- Algorithms are pinned to an allow-list; an unrecognised algorithm is a failure, closing off algorithm-confusion.
- The chain is anchored on the IANA root KSK DS records held in-code; trust comes from the cryptography, not the transport.
- Signers are in-bailiwick enforced — a validly-signed zone cannot forge another zone's records. This closes a cross-zone forgery bypass found during pre-release adversarial review.
Domain Connect
Domain Connect discovery turns a TXT record that
the zone's owner controls (_domainconnect.<domain>) into an HTTPS request from your
server, and the settings document it returns names a second host (urlAPI). Both
are treated as untrusted:
- Only plain
httpsURLs are fetched: no other scheme, no whitespace, userinfo, query or fragment, and only a hostname or IP literal as host. The same rule applies to every URL in the settings document (urlSyncUX,urlAsyncUX,urlAPI,urlControlPanel), so ajavascript:orhttp://urlSyncUXnever reaches an apply URL; such a document is treated as no settings. - Every
A/AAAAaddress of the host must be public (the same filter as for nameservers); a failed lookup means no request. The request is then pinned to the address that passed, with TLS still verified against the host name, so a second DNS answer cannot redirect it to an internal address. Redirects are not followed, the whole request is bounded by the timeout, and a body over 64 KiB is refused. - The pinning depends on the
Transport. The defaultStreamTransporthonours the$resolvedIpit is given; a custom transport that resolves the host again loses this protection. - Any port on a public host is accepted.
allowNonPublicHoststurns the checks off and is meant for local testing only. It is a separate switch fromallowNonPublicNameservers(Dns::domainConnect($signer, allowNonPublicHosts: true)), so trusting internal nameservers does not also trust internal Domain Connect hosts. - The signing key must be RSA of at least 2048 bits;
OpenSslRs256Signerrefuses a smaller one and marks the PEM argument#[\SensitiveParameter].
The apply URL is signed with RS256 over the encoded query string — domain, host,
redirect_uri, state, the template variables and groupId. The sig and key
parameters are appended after signing and are not covered by it; the DNS provider
reads the public key from <key>.<syncPubKeyDomain>. Signing uses openssl_sign()
with the algorithm fixed. PublicKeyRecords::for() accepts only an RSA public
key and refuses a private key, so the key you sign with cannot be published in DNS
by mistake. The module does not validate the state returned on the redirect; that
is the application's job. See Signing.
Testing and review — honest scope
The DNSSEC module is tested against real captured signed-zone vectors and self-signed test chains, and was adversarially security-reviewed before release. It has not had a formal third-party audit, and the package makes no conformance-certification claim. Treat it as carefully-engineered, not certified.
Out of scope
This is a DNS-only library. It does not perform live SMTP probing, RBL/blacklist lookups, or geo-distributed measurement — see the diagnostics scope. It reads DNS; it does not manage zones, write records, or act as a resolver daemon.