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Signals authentication assessment

Signals authentication assessment

This integration branch uses the optional assessment contract from laravel-id and the public laravel-signals-client. It is not enabled by default. No production credentials or deployment have been activated.

Set SIGNALS_AUTH_ENABLED=true, the exact SIGNALS_AUTH_ID_ENVIRONMENT, an HTTPS Signals API origin and a project/environment key with only the evaluate scope. The entity namespace defaults to cbox-id and must equal the namespace in the customer's mapping. The entity type is user; its identifier is ID's verified subject ID. Credentials for importing the public ID feed are separate and read-only.

Every session creation and every user-token issuance passes the package assessment hook. Machine credentials have no user to assess. The HTTP deadline is 80 ms including connection, without retries or redirects. Requests use server-owned subject, organization and authentication facts; no password, OTP or bearer token is sent as context. The device identifier is Radar's environment-scoped keyed pseudonym of the first-party device cookie. Another ID environment is never exported under the configured Signals key.

Only unexpired high/critical identity or access signals with ready coverage and usable data timestamps trigger a challenge. Unknown types, incomplete or degraded evidence do not manufacture a low-risk decision: ordinary ID policy continues. Transport, quota and service failures are audited as unavailable and also continue ordinary ID policy. Existing subject status, MFA mandates, authorization and independent sensitive-action freshness checks remain enforced.

Fresh strong authentication (ID's existing AAL2 definition, at most five minutes old) handles the signal without another challenge. Audit entries retain the assessment, handled signal revisions, decision and achieved assurance. Old, unknown or future authentication timestamps are not fresh proof. Hosted and embedded password flows reuse the existing MFA/passkey door. With no usable enrolled factor, ID does not issue a session; existing recovery remains necessary. Non-interactive session creation receives a refusal, and OAuth user-token grants receive invalid_grant.

The existing user.session_started event remains the final outcome, separate from assessment. It includes user_id, session_id, verified amr, outcome=success and the device pseudonym for the configured environment. Each actual login has its own durable event ID. Map success to the generic identity.login outcome succeeded; map device_id to device. A refused or pending assessment is never a successful login observation. The public event feed retains its environment/organization access controls.

Already issued JWT access tokens are not retroactively invalidated by this assessment. Offline validation continues until expiry. Use the existing revocation/introspection controls where required, or reevaluate at a later protected action. Refresh/user-token issuance invokes the hook again and does not treat unknown historical AMR as a fresh factor. This integration does not add a webhook-driven JWT revocation mechanism.

Local verification and image preparation

Run the ordinary feature suite and tests/Integration/signals-auth-roundtrip.py from the Signals app checkout. The latter provisions a new isolated engine scope, imports customer-defined events via the public SDK, verifies actual high-risk password refusal and actual TOTP completion, and revokes its test API key. It requires the real local PostgreSQL/NATS/ClickHouse stack; it refuses a non-loopback engine. Add --browser to verify the hosted password/no-factor and actual TOTP flow, then read the final outcome from the public scoped event API and import it through the public Signals SDK. The proof waits for durable history before asserting ready coverage.

The build is self-contained. packages/signals-client contains the reviewed source at commit 454786bc445423f123aec2358bd4c7e6b7381e06, with the original archive and manifest under build/dependencies. Its Composer version is dev-sd/security-tenant-context; there is no published-version alias. The identity engine uses laravel-id ^1.28.0.

Run php bin/verify-signals-sdk.php before installation. CI and Docker run this same check: the archive hash, every extracted file, unexpected files and symlinks are validated before Composer can install the dependency. Docker needs only the repository context; no sibling checkout, credentials or additional BuildKit context is required. The optional source exporter remains available for reviewing a replacement snapshot. Public release and production activation require separate authorization and verification.

The following verification counts describe the earlier Signals integration baseline, not the final permissions-overhaul acceptance:

Host validation: 5,936 PHP tests / 61,129 assertions with one existing skip; 200 frontend tests, TypeScript and Vite production build. Wayfinder 0.1.23 preserves method-qualified exports for multiple API verbs sharing a path and handles QUERY. Vitest 5.1.0 removes the vulnerable development mock server; custom accessibility matcher declarations follow its typed contract. No checks or assertions disabled. Production dependency and npm audits report no known advisories.

Final frontend verification also includes the complete lint and format gates. Existing portal rows now use their field identity instead of array position; account-link forms retain the normal reading/focus order. Twenty-five existing format deviations were normalized with the repository's formatter. All 200 frontend tests, TypeScript, lint and formatting pass. The reviewed image boots configuration and route caches with networking disabled; enabling Signals remains an explicit environment configuration, disabled by default.