Security
Security
This section covers the security surfaces the Cbox ID app adds on top of the identity engine, and the system-level compliance view.
- Adaptive risk — risk-based authentication: every sign-in is scored and, under enforcement, adapts (allow / step-up / deny).
- Compliance — the system-level control mapping (framework controls
- what this app adds + what remains yours).
The framework-level security posture — tenant isolation, the crypto kernel, the
tamper-evident audit log, and the STRIDE threat model — lives in the
cboxdk/laravel-id package docs:
Security
and
Threat model.
See also this repository's SECURITY.md
for the vulnerability-reporting policy.
Operator security surfaces
These are behaviours the app ships that an operator should understand.
Step-up authentication (/sudo)
Sensitive actions (managing operators, rotating credentials, changing security settings, adding a passkey or connecting a sign-in method) require re-authentication into a short-lived elevated "sudo" session even when the user is already signed in. The elevation lasts 15 minutes and does not persist for the whole session. This limits the blast radius of a hijacked, already-authenticated session.
The prompt opens where the person is. When a click needs a fresh step-up, the page shows a Confirm it's you dialog with the reason the action gave ("Adding a passkey gives you a new way to sign in."). Once the password is accepted, the action the person clicked runs: the same request, with the same data. A passkey enrolment ends the dialog on a Continue: create passkey button, because browsers only run the passkey ceremony inside a click. A wrong password is shown in the dialog and nothing runs. Five wrong attempts lock the prompt for a minute, exactly as on the full-page form.
How it works, for anyone integrating with the console's endpoints:
- A gated request made by a script (an Inertia visit or a JSON call) is refused with
403, the headerX-Cbox-Step-Up: <confirm URL>and a body{ "error", "sudo", "step_up": { "plane", "confirm", "reason" } }.sudois the full-page screen, for a client that cannot show a dialog. - The dialog posts
{ "password" }as JSON to the confirm URL and gets200 { "confirmed": true },422witherrors.password, or429withRetry-After. - A page opened directly (a bookmark, a link opened in a new tab) still goes to the
full-page
/sudoscreen and comes back to that page. Opened with nothing pending,/sudoreturns you to the page you came from.
There are two separate step-ups. The organization console and My account use /sudo,
which checks the signed-in person's password. The environment console uses
/admin/sudo, which checks the administrator's own platform account. Confirming one
never opens the other. Neither is offered during an impersonation.
Organization switcher
A user who belongs to several organizations switches the active organization from the sidebar. The switch is server-verified against membership on every request — the active org is resolved from the authenticated user's memberships, not from a client-supplied value, so a user can only ever act within an org they actually belong to. The role in effect updates with the switch, and switching is audited.
Self-service signup modes
CBOX_ID_SIGNUP_MODE gates the public /signup surface (see
Configuration):
open— anyone may create an account + organization (the default).invite_only— public signup is closed; new accounts arrive only through admin invitations, which keep working.closed— no self-service signup at all.
Admin- and operator-initiated provisioning (invitations, the /admin/platform pages) is
never gated by this — it is not self-service. Set this to invite_only or
closed for a private or internal deployment so the internet-facing signup form
cannot be used to create organizations.
Signup abuse controls
An open signup is an internet-facing "create infrastructure" button, so it carries
three layers beyond the mode gate — described in full under
Adaptive risk:
- A per-IP rate limit and a honeypot + submit-timing pair, both fed to the risk scorer.
- A risk-triggered CAPTCHA (Cloudflare Turnstile) on a challenged signup only —
never on every signup, and entirely inert unless
CBOX_ID_TURNSTILE_*is configured. - Deferred environment provisioning. A self-serve signup creates the workspace, its owner and its first project immediately, but the environment — the routable IdP with its own signing key — is stood up only when the owner opens the verification link in their inbox. An unverified signup therefore costs nothing worth farming.
Because (3) puts a real owner's whole workspace behind one email, the workspace launchpad carries a resend control while the environment is held back. It re-sends only to the signed-in member's own address (the action accepts a member, never an address), retires every link issued before it so exactly one is ever live, answers identically whether or not the address is already confirmed — so it cannot be used to test verification state — and is throttled to 3 sends per 10 minutes per member, because outbound mail is the resource worth abusing here.
MCP sign-in at the platform root
On a multi-tenant deployment the platform root is not an identity provider for anybody's
app: it serves no OpenID Connect discovery, UserInfo, SAML or SCIM, and an organization
admin who creates an OAuth client there (Developers › Apps) cannot use it to sign anyone
in. It does sign in two kinds of client, both for its own /mcp:
- the platform's own first-party clients, such as the
cboxCLI (device grant); - since
CBOX_ID_ROOT_MCP_OAUTH(on by default), any MCP client, soclaude mcp add --transport http cbox-id https://<platform-root>/mcpgives a person one connection for their whole workspace.
What the second one exposes on the root, and what bounds it:
| Surface | Bound |
|---|---|
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
The /mcp resource only; any other path is 404. |
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server |
Written for the root: code flow with S256 PKCE, public clients, the root /mcp scopes and offline_access. No OpenID Connect fields. |
POST /oauth/register |
The mcp profile only (public client, PKCE, https or loopback redirects, the authorization-code and refresh grants). In any other CBOX_ID_DCR_MODE the root registers nothing. No RFC 7592 management. Per-address ceiling (CBOX_ID_DCR_MAX_PER_IP_PER_HOUR), and unused clients are pruned (CBOX_ID_PRUNE_UNUSED_DYNAMIC_CLIENTS). |
/oauth/authorize, consent, /oauth/token, /oauth/revoke |
Only for a client that registered itself at the root or a client ID metadata document, besides the first-party clients. /oauth/authorize is metered per address at the root (60/min); the token endpoint keeps its 30/min. |
| Who can finish signing in | Only a member of a workspace's team or an operator. Anyone else is refused on the page. |
| What the token is for | The root's /mcp only. A missing resource defaults to it; any other (the root issuer, a registered API, another host) is invalid_target, at /authorize and at the token endpoint, refresh included. openid, profile and email are refused, so no ID token is issued. |
| What the token can do | What the person can do, within the scopes they allowed. The consent screen is never skipped for these clients, and every critical action waits for the person's approval. |
| Record | Each registration as mcp.client_registered with the address it came from; each consent as mcp.client_authorized in the person's workspace trail. |
Why this is acceptable: the risk the root's wall exists for is a customer turning the one
host every customer's owner trusts into a sign-in page for their own app. These clients
cannot do that. They can only ever be issued a token for the root's /mcp, which acts as
the person who signed in and nothing more, and the person sees the consent screen every
time, with the client marked as one that registered itself. CBOX_ID_ROOT_MCP_OAUTH=false
returns every surface above to 404.
Rate limits on the anonymous browser doors
Every door a stranger can reach without signing in, that sends mail, mints a challenge or
looks a secret up, sits behind a named limiter (App\Http\WebRateLimiters) answering a
429 with Retry-After. Each key starts with the route and the environment, so one
door's budget never spends another's and one tenant's office NAT never locks out another
tenant:
| Door | Limiter | Keyed on |
|---|---|---|
Sign-in link request (/login/magic-link) |
magic-link-send |
address + email typed in (fingerprinted), and address alone |
| Sign-in, invitation, email-confirmation and Admin Portal links | link-token |
address + token (fingerprinted), and address alone |
| Passkey sign-in and enrolment challenges, hosted and Frontend API | passkey |
address, and the signed-in person for enrolment |
| Signup confirmation resend | verification-resend |
address + the signed-in person |
First-run claim (/first-run) |
first-run |
address |
Several of these also refuse with a sentence from inside — "try again in a minute" on the form. That is what a person reads; the limiter is the ceiling for a script that does not read it.
Somebody else's id answers 404
Every action that takes an id — on the console, the REST API and MCP alike — answers another environment's, another organization's or another person's id exactly as it answers an id that never existed. A registry-driven test sweeps every one; see Cross-tenant id sweep.
End-user consent surfaces
- OAuth consent (
/oauth/authorize) — registered clients requesting access are presented to the signed-in user, who reviews the requested scopes and grants or denies them. - Device approval (
/device) — the Device Authorization Grant confirmation page, where a user approves a device (by user code) before it receives tokens.
See Installation & first run for more on these flows.